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Meyer, Pierce, and the History of the Entire Human Race: 
Barbarism, Social Progress, and (the Fall and Rise of) Parental Rights 
 
 
Jeffrey Shulman* 
 
 
Introduction: 
 
The Past is Prologue.  But Whose Past? 
 
In order to submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens, Sparta 
assembled the males at seven into barracks and intrusted their subsequent 
education and training to official guardians. Although such measures have been 
deliberately approved by men of great genius their ideas touching the relation 
between individual and state were wholly different from those upon which our 
institutions rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any Legislature could impose 
such restrictions upon the people of a state without doing violence to both letter 
and spirit of the Constitution. 
 
   Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) 
 
 
 In this day and under our civilization, the child of man is his parent’s child 
and not the state’s.  Gone would be the most potent reason for women to be chaste 
and men to be continent, if it were otherwise.  It was entirely logical for Plato, in 
his scheme for an “ideal commonwealth,” to make women common; if their 
children were to be taken from them, and brought up away from them by the state 
for its own ends and purposes, personal morality was, after all, a secondary 
matter.  The state-bred monster could then mean little to his parents; and such a 
creature could readily be turned to whatever use a tyrannical government might 
conceive to be in its own interest.  In such a society there would soon be neither 
personal nor social liberty. 
 
Brief of Appellee 
(William Guthrie and Bernard Hershkopf)  
Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925)1 
 
 
                                                 
* J.D. Georgetown University Law Center; Ph.D., University of Wisconsin-Madison.  The research for this article 
was supported by a grant from the Georgetown University Law Center.  My heartfelt thanks, as always, to my 
colleague and friend, David Wolitz.  And, also as always, I am grateful for the assistance of the Georgetown Law 
Library Research Services, especially for the support—and patience—of Yelena Rodriguez and Erie Taniuchi.  My 
appreciation as well to Alexa Gervasi, who provided invaluable editorial assistance.    
1 Brief of Appellee, Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Mary and Joseph, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), in 
OREGON SCHOOL CASES: COMPLETE RECORD 274 (1925). 
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 On February 23, 1923, attorney Arthur F. Mullen stood before the United States Supreme 
Court to protest a state law that, in his words, would “change the history of the entire human 
race.”2  For Mullen, as for the Court, this dire declaration was not mere hyperbole.  The occasion 
was the case Meyer v. Nebraska (1923), which would determine the fate, if not of the entire 
human race, of a 1919 Nebraska state statute prohibiting the teaching of modern foreign 
languages in the primary grades of all schools, public and private.3  On its face the law would not 
seem to hold such apocalyptic implications, but the statute touched the highly sensitive twin 
nerves of both parental authority and family autonomy.  For the plaintiff in error, Mullen argued 
that, in effect, the state was claiming the authority to establish a curricular monopoly at school, 
and, practically perhaps, at home.  By “mere fiat” the state could “take the child from the parent 
and prescribe the mental bill of fare which that child shall follow in its education.”4  This, 
Mullen warned the Court, was “the principle of the soviet.”5   
 Meyer was a creature of its judicial time, one of many early twentieth-century cases that 
dealt with challenges to state educational regulation.  Such matters as compulsory attendance and 
curricular requirements generated heated debate, both in and out of the courtroom, for these 
cases were not just about the legal question of who controls the child’s education.  At bottom, 
they were about the more profound question of to whom the child belongs.  On this question 
many people did believe that the history of the human race might hang.   
 Mullen’s reference to soviet principle was not mere window-dressing.  The Russian 
Revolution, which brought with it a radical skepticism toward the private family, seemed to 
                                                 
2 Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
3 262 U.S. 390 (1923).  The state statute also had imposed restrictions on the use of foreign languages as a medium 
of instruction. 
4 Transcript of Oral Argument, Meyer v. Nebraska, supra note 2, at 8. 
5 Id. 
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make only too concrete the threat from an all-grasping state.6  Communist theory taught that the 
abolition of the family was the fruit of history’s steady and upward march to an antipatriarchal 
and property-less new world order.  For Karl Marx and Friedrich Engles, history is the story of 
social progress, the central motif of which involves the demise of privacy and possession.  The 
idea that the child belongs to the parent, so the story runs, is symptomatic of cultures mired in a 
primitive patriarchalism.  As society progresses, the family assumes a public responsibility—and 
thus becomes part of the ordinary business of the state, and subject to ordinary state regulation.  
In time, the private family, like the material conditions of which it is a product, will be no more 
than a vestige of the patriarchal past.  
 In the 1920s, it appeared to many that state paternalism was already running amok at 
home, and that, as Mullen warned, the state as educator would soon be able to take children from 
their parents and bring them up for its own ends and purposes.  In 1922, the year before Meyer 
reached the Court, the voters of Oregon approved an initiative mandating public education.  The 
next year, in Meyer, the law professor William Dameron Guthrie filed an amicus brief 
specifically, and preemptively, to address the Oregon compulsory public school law, the 
constitutionality of which would be decided in Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925).7  Guthrie 
described the Oregon act as “a revolutionary piece of legislation,” his brief evoking images of 
Bolshevik menace: 
                                                 
6 The Red Scare has been described as “a nation-wide anti-radical hysteria provoked by a mounting fear and anxiety 
that a Bolshevik revolution in America was imminent—a revolution that would change Church, home, marriage, 
civility, and the American way of life.” MURRAY B. LEVIN, POLITICAL HYSTERIA IN AMERICA: THE DEMOCRATIC 
CAPACITY FOR REPRESSION 29 (1971). 
7 Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).  On the historical 
background of Meyer and Pierce, see generally PAULA ABRAMS, CROSS PURPOSES: PIERCE V. SOCIETY OF SISTERS 
AND THE STRUGGLE OVER COMPULSORY PUBLIC EDUCATION (2009); WILLIAM G. ROSS, FORGING NEW FREEDOMS: 
NATIVISM, EDUCATION, AND THE CONSTITUTION 1917–1927 (1994); DAVID TYACK, THOMAS JAMES, AND AARON 
BENAVOT, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, 1785–1954 177-92 (1987); Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, 
“Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1992); 
William G. Ross, A Judicial Janus: Meyer v. Nebraska in Historical Perspective, 47 U. CIN. L. REV. 125 (1988); 
David B. Tyack, The Perils of Pluralism: The Background of the Pierce Case, 74 AM. HIST. REV. 74 (1968) 
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It adopts the favorite device of communistic Russia—the destruction of parental 
authority, the standardization of education despite the diversity of character, aptitude, 
inclination and physical capacity of children, and the monopolization by the state of the 
training and teaching of the young.  The love and interest of the parent for his child, such 
a statute condemns as evil; the instinctive preferences and desires of the child itself, such 
a law represses as if mere manifestations of an incorrigible or baneful disposition.8 
 
In the Court’s first Lochnerian foray into non-economic substantive due process, the shadow of 
socialist child-raising was never far from the legal debate 
 History is sometimes spoken of as the final court of judgment.  But in Meyer and Pierce 
the Court sat in judgment of history.  On trial, it might be said, was not just the principle of the 
soviet, but one of the driving historical principles of the late-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.  
The era witnessed the emergence of new disciplines that embraced a materialistic theory of 
cultural progress and an evolutionary view of law.  In place of right reasoning, to say nothing of 
revealed dogma, sociologists and cultural anthropologists brought the methods of empirical 
research, or at least what at the time passed for empirical research, to bear on questions relating 
to family and the state.  One result of these early social science efforts was the enormously 
influential stage-theory of societal development.9  Simply enough, stage-theory describes how a 
                                                 
8 Brief for William D. Guthrie & Bernard Hershkopf as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-in-Error at 3, Meyer v. 
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (No. 325). 
9 On “stadial” or “conjectural” history, see generally CHRISTOPHER J. BERRY, SOCIAL THEORY OF THE SCOTTISH 
ENLIGHTENMENT (1997); DAVID SPADAFORA, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN (1990); 
RONALD L. MEEK, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE IGNOBLE SAVAGE (1976); see also KAREN O’BRIEN, WOMEN AND 
ENLIGHTENMENT IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY BRITAIN 85-109 (2009).  On stadial theory and European colonialism, 
see Jennifer Pitts, Empire, Progress, and the “Savage Mind,” in COLONIALISM AND ITS LEGACIES 21-52 (Jacob T. 
Levy ed. with Iris Marion Young, 2011).  Gordon S. Wood, among others, has shown how important stage theory 
was in America’s early intellectual and cultural history. See, e.g., EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY 
REPUBLIC, 1789-1815 42-43, 385-99 (2009).  Thomas Jefferson’s observations on America’s stadial geography are 
well known:  “Let a philosophic traveler commence a journey from the savages of the Rocky Mountains, eastwardly 
towards our seacoast.  These he would observe in the earliest stage of association, living under no law but that of 
nature, subsisting and covering themselves with the flesh and skin of wild beasts.  He would next find those on our 
frontiers, in the pastoral state, raising domestic animals to supply the defects of hunting.  Then succeed our own 
semi-barbarous citizens the pioneers of advance civilization, and so in his progress he would meet the gradual 
shades of improving man until he would reach his, as yet, most improved state in our seaboard towns.  This, in fact, 
is equivalent to a survey, in time, of the progress of man from the infancy of creation to the present.”  Letter from 
Thomas Jefferson to William Ludlow, September 6, 1824, reprinted in 7 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 337 
(H. A. Washington ed., Taylor and Maury, Washington, D.C., 1864).  On Jefferson and the development of early 
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society moves from a primitive to a civilized state of development, and how it might fail to do 
so.  For some stage-theorists, their own society provided a model of civilized achievement; for 
others, more work remained to be done.  In either case, stage-theorists and the legal scholars they 
influenced, with remarkable uniformity, concluded that social “progress” entails the decline and, 
by some accounts, the demise of parental authority.   
 This “research” was primitive by modern standards, and, it probably goes without saying, 
blatantly ethnocentric.  But the accuracy of the science is beside the point.  This body of work 
helps us see that prior to the Court’s seminal parenting cases some of the most influential 
students of law and society considered a rigid domestic paternalism, unhampered by 
governmental interference, to be nothing less than a mark of social primitivism.  Progress did not 
lie in the direction of parental rights, in the direction, that is, of a family unit walled off from the 
public domain by constitutional considerations.  Progress occurred as the authority of the 
parent—and, of course, this meant for the most part the authority of the father—was checked by 
public considerations, including the welfare of the child.   
 The Supreme Court struck back at this “progressive” model by making its own 
evolutionary claim.  History remained progressive, but, as the Court would have it, the 
betterment of society brings with it the steady diminution of state authority, nowhere more so 
than in state regulation of the family.  Meyer is famous for its repudiation of ancient models of 
the paternalistic state.  For the Court, Justice James Clark McReynolds compared Nebraska’s 
language prohibition to the communistic parenting measures of ancient Sparta (“In order to 
submerge the individual and develop ideal citizens, Sparta assembled the males at seven into 
                                                                                                                                                             
American anthropology, see ROBERT L. BETTINGER, RAVEN GARVEY & SHANNON TUSHINGHAM, HUNTER-
GATHERERS: ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 35-36 (2d ed. 2015).   
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barracks and intrusted their subsequent education and training to official guardians.”10) and 
Plato’s Republic (“[T]he wives of our guardians are to be common, and their children are to be 
common, and no parent is to know his own child, nor any child his parent.”11).  Such measures, 
said McReynolds, rested on an allocation of educational control wholly at odds with the letter 
and spirit of the Constitution.12  This cautionary note was heard again in Pierce.  Once more 
writing for the Court, McReynolds made the case one about the power of the state “to 
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only.”13  He 
famously declared that “[t]he child was not the mere creature of the state.”14  In a civilized 
society, the child is decidedly his parent’s.    
 McReynolds might have agreed with Judge (and later Supreme Court Justice) Rufus 
Peckham, who would author Lochner,15 that at last history had reached a turning point.  Writing 
in 1899, Peckham described the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as a time “when views of 
governmental interference with the private concerns of individuals were carried to the greatest 
extent.”16  He denounced state paternalism as a throwback to the false ideas of a bygone time 
when “[r]ights which we would now regard as secured to us by our bill of rights against all 
assaults, from whatever quarter, were . . . regarded as the proper subjects of legislative 
interference and suppression.”17  Similarly, Judge David Brewer, who would join Peckham’s 
                                                 
10 262 U.S. at 401–02.  In American political thought, Sparta—or, perhaps more accurately, the idea of Sparta—held 
a richer repository of meanings than McReynolds’ representation of the city-state suggests.  For some of the 
Founding Fathers, Sparta served as a model of republican virtue, see GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787 424 (1969), an example of self-sacrifice that led Samuel Adams to hope that 
America would become “the Christian Sparta,” see id. at 118.  
11 Id.  
12 Id.  
13 268 U.S. at 535. 
14 Id.  
15 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
16 People ex rel. Annan v. Walsh, 22 N.E. 682, 686 (N.Y. 1899) (Peckham, J., dissenting). 
17 Id. at 687. 
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opinion for the Lochner court, wrote in 1892 to deplore the effects of unwarranted state 
regulation (pictured so well in Edward Bellamy’s bestselling look backward at the future). 
The paternal theory of government is to me odious.  The utmost possible liberty to the 
individual, and the fullest possible protection to him and his property, is both the 
limitation and duty of government.  If it may regulate the price of one service which is 
not a public service, or the compensation for the use of one kind of property, which is not 
devoted to a public use, why may it not with equal reason regulate the price of all service, 
and the compensation to be paid for the use of all property?  And, if so, ‘Looking 
Backward’ is nearer than a dream.18 
 
 Thankfully, from Peckham’s point of view, a new era was embracing “the more correct 
ideas which an increase of civilization and a fuller knowledge of the fundamental laws of 
political economy, and a truer conception of the proper functions of government have given us at 
the present day.”19  Looking backward, the Court’s Lochnerians saw what to them were the 
odious features of paternalistic government.  Looking forward, they saw the promise of a modern 
libertarian state. 
 With regard to America’s family law past, the claim that a paternalistic past had made 
“rights” the subject of legislative interference was not far off the mark.  It is commonly assumed 
that “[h]istorically, fathers were entitled to possession of their children. . . .  In essence, fathers 
had an absolute right to their children, ‘owning’ them as if they held ‘title’ to them.”20  For many 
parentalists,21 the right to parent is considered a time-honored staple of personal liberty deeply 
rooted in the common law and guaranteed by core constitutional principles.  For some, of course, 
                                                 
18 Budd v. People, 143 U.S. 517, 551 (1892) (Brewer, J., dissenting). 
19 People v. Budd, 117 N.Y. 1, 47 (1889) (Peckham, J., dissenting). 
20 Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody 
Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 737 (1988); cf., e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott and Robert E. Scott, Parents as 
Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401, 2406 (1995) (“Before the twentieth century, the combined status of biological 
parenthood and marriage signified a legal authority [over children] of almost limitless scope.”); Janet L. Dolgin, Just 
a Gene: Judicial Assumptions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REV. 637, 645 n.29 (1993) (Before the Industrial 
Revolution, “under common law, fathers had an absolute right to the custody of their children.  The common law 
view [of paternal rights] represented a modification of Roman law under which children were fully defined as 
paternal property.”) (citation omitted). 
21  I take the term “parentalist” from the strongly argued essay by Stephen Gilles On Educating Children: A 
Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937 (1996). 
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the right to parent emanates from law with an even more compelling lineage.  It is a right often 
presented as prescribed by natural law, as higher than the Constitution, “precedent, both in order 
of time and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society” (as James Madison put it);22 
and state interference with parental rights is thus a betrayal of even greater proportions.  Whether 
the right to parent is understood as man-made or the work of some greater author, parentalists 
argue that state interference with parental decisionmaking erodes the historical—even timeless, 
perhaps—bedrock of fundamental personal liberties.      
 It turns out, though, that in the American legal tradition the roots of parental rights are 
relatively shallow.  In fact, this is a tradition that treated paternal absolutism and its rights 
foundation as barbaric.23  “That the father had any such absolute right to the care and custody of 
his children,” that the state lacked the authority to “control the conduct of the father in the 
education of his children”—these propositions, Joseph Story wrote, “would strike all civilized 
countries with astonishment.”24  In the nineteenth century, court after court, and commentator 
after commentator, declared that the “old barbarity has gradually given way until the modern 
civilization concedes to the child the same human attributes which it acknowledges in the 
father.”25  The New York state Supreme Court of Judicature was hardly alone when it declared 
that “[t]hose countries in which the father has a general power to dispose of his children, have 
                                                 
22 JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS, in THE SUPREME COURT 
ON CHURCH AND STATE 18 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1988). 
23 See, e.g., State v. Clottu, 33 Ind. 409, 411 (1870) (“The duties and authority pertaining to the relation of parent 
and child have their foundations in nature, it is true.  Nevertheless, all civilized governments have regarded this 
relation as falling within the legitimate scope of legislative control.  Except in countries which lie in barbarism, the 
authority of the parent over the child is nowhere left absolutely without municipal definition and regulation.”). 
24 Joseph Story, 2 COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 578 (§ 1347) (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co., 1836). 
25 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, 2 NEW COMMENTARIES ON MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND SEPARATION 454 (§ 1163) 
(Chicago, T. H. Flood & Co. 1891) (“Under laws which have prevailed in some ages and countries, rendering the 
child a sort of chattel in the hands of its father, who could sell or kill it, the paternal right to its custody was 
necessarily inflexible.  But this old barbarity has gradually given way until the modern civilization concedes to the 
child the same human attributes which it acknowledges in the father.”) (footnote omitted). 
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always been considered barbarous.  Our own law never has allowed the exercise of such 
power.”26   
 Long before the Supreme Court’s seminal parenting cases took a due process turn, 
American courts had been working to fashion family law doctrine on the premise that parents are 
only entrusted with custody of the child, and then only as long as they meet their fiduciary duty 
to take proper care of the child.  This theme was embraced enthusiastically by American jurists.  
It was with no little self-satisfaction that they endorsed a child-centered jurisprudence that 
bypassed the paternalistic family law of their British counterparts.  American courts, to quote 
family law treatise writer Joel Bishop, travelled “more rapidly toward the light than in 
England.”27  However deeply rooted paternal prerogatives were in British common law, such 
rights found tough purchase in American soil.28  By the last quarter of the nineteenth century, 
one American court could confidently—admittedly, too confidently—proclaim that “[t]he 
                                                 
26 People ex rel. Barry v. Mercein, 3 Hill 399, 411 (N.Y. Sup. 1842); cf. JAMES KENT, 2 COMMENTARIES ON 
AMERICAN LAW 205 (O.W. Holmes, Jr., ed., 12th ed. Littleton, Co., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1873) (code of parent-
child relations under Roman law “was barbarous, and unfit for a free and civilized people”).  Reviewing the history 
of custody case law, the New York state Court for the Correction of Errors observed that “the American cases . . . 
showed it to be the established law of this country that the court, or officer, were authorized to exercise a discretion, 
and that the father was not entitled to demand a delivery of the child to him, upon habeas corpus, as an absolute 
right.” Mercein v. People ex rel. Barry, 25 Wend. 64, 93 (N.Y. 1840).  This was, the court pointed out, “also the law 
of England at the time of our separation from the mother country.” Id.  But since that period the decisions of the 
English courts “appeared to have gone back to the principles of a semi-barbarous age, when the wife was the slave 
of the husband, because he had the physical power to control her, and when the will of the strongest party 
constituted the rule of right.” Id.  The Court of Errors took evident pride in noting that “[t]his state has never been 
disgraced by laws so subversive of the welfare of infant children, of the rights of mothers, and of the morals of the 
people.” Id. at 105 (opinion of Alonzo C. Paige). 
27 BISHOP, 2 NEW COMMENTARIES, supra note 25, at 454–55 (§ 1163); cf. NORMA BASCH, FRAMING AMERICAN 
DIVORCE: FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION TO THE VICTORIANS 24 (1999) (“From both a substantive and 
procedural perspective, divorce law in the early republic was light years beyond its English equivalent.”). 
28 The great precedent regarding the proper response of the court was Lord Mansfield’s twofold declaration in Rex v. 
Delaval, 3 Burr. 1434, 1436 (K.B. 1763), that “[i]n cases of writs of habeas corpus directed to private persons, ‘to 
bring up infants,’” (1) “the Court is bound, ex debito justitiae, to set the infant free from an improper restraint,” but 
(2) “they [i.e., the courts] are not bound to deliver them over to any body nor to give them any privilege.”  The 
child’s deliverance was not an abstract question of rights.  It was a matter that “must be left to [the courts’] 
discretion, according to the circumstances that shall appear before them”; and if the child were of sufficient age, it 
was a matter on which the court would defer to his or her discretion.  See JEFFREY SHULMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
PARENT:  RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE ENFRANCHISEMENT OF THE CHILD 48-49 (2014). 
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substantial reality of the old common law right [of custody] has faded almost to fiction under the 
ameliorating influence of the modern common law.”29   
 This anti-patriarchal sentiment was no respecter of ideological boundary lines.  The 
theory was congenial to the moral philosophers and social theorists of the Scottish 
Enlightenment, whose confidence in human progress was a philosophic seedbed for America’s 
revolutionary generation; to libertarian-minded contractualists of late-nineteenth-century 
America, from whose lack of confidence in government emerged a model of social evolution that 
equated liberty with individual self-assertion, natural rights, and national wealth-building; and to 
the founding fathers of revolutionary socialism.  It was a part of the nineteenth century’s great 
idiom of secular progress and pragmatic social engineering, a story of worldly advancement and 
human achievement in which the courts had their own, not insignificant, role to play.  If Marx 
and Engels took anti-patriarchalism to its radical end-point, they were travelling on a well-worn 
path.  
 Part I of this article looks at what might be the most formative application of stage-theory 
to family relations, John Millar’s The Origins of the Distinctions of Ranks (1771).30  Drawing on 
the sociohistorical work of David Hume and Adam Smith, Millar provides an empirical account 
of how rights of personal authority (the right of husband over wife, father over children, and 
master over servant) arise out of and evolve in response to changing socioeconomic conditions.  
                                                 
29 Dixon v. Dixon, 2 Pa. C.C. 125, 127 (Pa. Com. Pl. 1886) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Lippincott v. 
Lippincott, 124 A. 532, 533 (N.J. Ch. 1924) (The day had long passed “when the rights of infants to be properly 
nurtured are subordinate to the strict legal rights of parents.”). 
30 JOHN MILLAR, THE ORIGIN OF THE DISTINCTION OF RANKS: OR, AN INQUIRY INTO THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH 
GIVE RISE TO INFLUENCE AND AUTHORITY IN THE DIFFERENT MEMBERS OF SOCIETY (4th ed., 1806).  The fourth 
edition, with an Introduction by Aaron Garrett, is available at 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Ftitle=287&Itemid=27, as part of the Online 
Library of Liberty, a project of Liberty Fund, Inc.  The third edition, with an Introduction by William Lehman, is 
reprinted in WILLIAM C. LEHMAN, JOHN MILLAR OF GLASGOW 1735-180: HIS LIFE AND THOUGHT AND HIS 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 167-322 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1960).  Quotations herein to THE 
ORIGIN OF THE DISTINCTION OF RANKS are from the Lehman edition.   
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For Millar, these rights do not exist “above” or “before” society; rather, they are the product of 
material circumstances, and they evolve as the human condition, both socially and individually—
for the two are intertwined31—progresses.  Parental rights are thus both adventitious (deriving 
from specific human conditions) and normative (deriving their authority from their contribution 
to human fulfillment).  They change in response to changing conditions, and they ought to move, 
though they do not do so inevitably or permanently, in the direction of greater liberty and 
equality.  The material and moral development of the parent-child relationship, Millar seeks to 
demonstrate, mirrors in microcosm the processes of social evolution. 32   The personal replicates 
the political; it shapes it and is shaped by it.  For Millar, there is little doubt that parental 
authority “has been reduced within narrower bounds, in proportion to the ordinary improvements 
of society.”33   
 A product of the Scottish Enlightenment’s focus on sociability, Millar’s historical critique 
of paternal authority translated comfortably to the individualistic currents of the nineteenth 
century.  Part II of this article looks at the work of two prominent libertarian legal theorists:  the 
British comparative cultural historian Henry Maine and the British moral philosopher Herbert 
Spencer.  Though these writers took different routes through the emerging sociological territory 
of the nineteenth century, they both employed the tools of comparative and historical 
jurisprudence, and they agreed that the historical record dictated the conclusion that there is no 
social progress without the repudiation of patriarchalism. 
                                                 
31 See, e.g., DANIEL I. O’NEILL, THE BURKE-WOLLSTONECRAFT DEBATE:  SAVAGERY, CIVILIZATION AND 
DEMOCRACY 44 (2007) (noting how “successive stages of social development” were considered “part of a positive 
natural progression, analogous to that of an individual human being as he passed from infancy to maturity”). 
32 Stage theory, for Millar and for such theorists as Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson, did not entail an unqualified 
belief in progress.  On this point, Duncan Forbes very usefully compares the scientific evolutionism of Millar with 
the radical utopianism of more polemical writers like Joseph Priestly and William Godwin. See “Scientific 
Whiggism”: Adam Smith and John Millar, 7 CAMBRIDGE J. 643, 648-52 (1953). 
33 MILLAR, RANKS (3d ed.), supra note 30, at 239. 
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  Sir Henry Maine is most famous for his argument that society and its legal framework 
evolved “from Status to Contract.”34  Less attention has been paid to a conclusion that, for 
Maine, follows from his contractualist thesis:  that the movement of “progressive” societies 
involves a steady reduction in both paternal power and family dependency.  The early stage of 
the family empire, as described by Maine, was a true “domestic despotism.”35  But imperial rule 
at home followed the course of the political empire, falling before a legal order based on 
voluntary association, under which the family, like society at large, is the product of free 
agreement among free individuals. 
 Herbert Spencer has the dubious distinction of being closely associated with—indeed, 
perhaps of being the philosophical progenitor of—the Supreme Court’s foray into classical 
liberalism (and its case-law poster-child, Lochner v. New York36).  The radical libertarianism of 
Spencer on parent-child relations is rarely discussed.  Spencer applied his principle of equal 
liberty to besiege the archaic precincts of despotic paternalism—the “arbitrary rule of one human 
being over another, no matter in what form it may appear.”37  Even when it appeared in the form 
of parental care.  Actually, especially when.  Spencer held a particular antipathy toward the 
assertion of despotic domestic sovereignty.  “Uncover its roots,” he writes, “and the theory of 
                                                 
34 HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS 
RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 170 (4th ed., London, John Murray 1870).  
35 Id. at 137. 
36 Spencer is most well known, thanks in no small part to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., for his SOCIAL 
STATICS: OR, THE CONDITIONS ESSENTIAL TO HUMAN HAPPINESS (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1872). See 
Lochner, supra note 15, at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The liberty of the citizen to do as he likes so long as he does 
not interfere with the liberty of others to do the same, which has been a shibboleth for some well-known writers, is 
interfered with by school laws, by the Post Office, by every state or municipal institution which takes his money for 
purposes thought desirable, whether he likes it or not.  The Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert 
Spencer’s Social Statics.”). 
37 SPENCER, SOCIAL STATICS, at 183. 
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paternal authority will be found not to grow out of man’s love for his offspring but out of his 
love of dominion.”38  
 (The libertarian treatise writer Christopher Tiedeman also belongs in this category.  His 
exposition of constitutional law, A Treatise on the Limitations of Police Power in the United 
States, has earned him a place in the pantheon of proponents of limited government.39  A foe of 
state paternalism and a fierce critic of socialism, Tiedeman nonetheless considered parental 
authority to be “in the nature of a trust, reposed in [the parent] by the dictate of the State.”40  He 
makes the historical argument that when the ancient family evolved from a freestanding political 
entity to what he calls a “domestic relation,” children became autonomous members of the 
collective polity, at which point they “acquire[d] political and civil rights, independently of the 
father.”41  For Tiedeman, “[t]he parent has no natural vested right to the control of the child”; to 
the contrary, parental control “may be extended or contracted, according as the public welfare 
may require.”42  I have discussed Tiedeman elsewhere.43)  
 With its focus on economic conditions and its pragmatic approach to rights, stage-theory 
could be put to far more radical uses.  In the socialist utopia imagined by Marx and Engels, the 
private family would vanish along with private property and profit.  In fact, the Soviet Union had 
the opportunity to practice what it preached, unleashing the chains of domestic oppression with 
the 1918 Code on Marriage, the Family, and Guardianship.  Part III of this article has two goals:  
to remind readers 1) that socialist historymaking considered the dissolution of the bourgeois 
family as a key step toward a stateless state, and 2) that this repudiation of the family was no 
                                                 
38 Id. at 211. 
39 CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES (St. 
Louis, F. H. Thomas Law Book Co. 1886). 
40 Id. at 553. 
41 Id. at 552. 
42 Id. 
43 See SHULMAN, supra note 28, at 67-73. 
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mere doctrinal abstraction for American legal professionals.  As the Supreme Court weighed the 
competing claims of parent and state, the threat of a socialist takeover of the family—“the 
principle of the soviet”—was always close at hand.   
 In response to this unhappy prospect, the Court drew from the murky, mysterious well of 
state-constraining liberties we refer to as substantive due process.  Meyer and Pierce widened the  
constitutional portal for a deeply individualistic and fiercely libertarian notion of natural law that 
the Court had opened in its economic regulation cases.44  Compelled to seek some objective 
measure of what process is constitutionally due, the Court began to write its own narrative of 
social progress, a story whose theme was the deep-rootedness of deference to parental 
authority.45  Repudiating statist, communistic models like Sparta, this story, premised on a 
cursory and tendentious treatment of ancient family law, put forward a new legal ethnohistory.  
Sparta was the barbaric beginning of the cultural negotiation between parent and state; social 
primitivism lay not in the patriarchal family but in the paternalistic state, and progress lay not in 
a movement from personal rights to public responsibilities, but just the reverse.  With regard to 
domestic life, this narrative of progress was one of struggle:  the struggle of parents against an 
ever encroaching state.  In time, however, regulation of the family would no longer be 
considered one of the proper functions of government.  By making a claim loosely based on 
historical sociology—that is, a claim about the origin and development of family life and 
                                                 
44 Of course, natural law theory need not be dominated by a focus on individual rights.  On natural rights as “being 
mere means to the fulfillment of duties,” see KNUD HAAKNOSSEN, NATURAL LAW AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY: FROM 
GROTIUS TO THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 6 (1996). 
45 David Upham argues that the Pierce Court declined the invitation to embrace a spacious, natural-rights position in 
support of parental authority.  He notes that the Court “indicated that the right to direct a child’s education results 
not from a natural familial relation, but simply as a necessary concomitant to the power of custody, however defined 
and assigned.  For the Court, it was not natural parenthood that gave both custodial and educational rights; it was 
custodial power—whether resulting from biology, positive law, or otherwise—that gave educational rights.”  David 
R. Upham, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, Natural Law, and the Pope’s Extraordinary—But Undeserved—Praise of the 
American Republic [Draft], 12, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2018396 (footnote 
omitted). 
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parental authority—McReynolds co-opted the methodology of a substantial body of “scientific” 
research that had challenged—indeed, rejected—the progressiveness of legal regimes affording 
great deference to parental rights.  Now, the Supreme Court had its own history to recount.  If 
history has an ash heap, and if the Court had its way, Sparta would be relegated to it.   
 
I 
 
John Millar: 
 
Anti-Patriarchalism and the Social State 
 
 
 For the moral philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment—whose influence on American 
legal history and culture was considerable—sociability was the key to understanding human 
nature and civil society.46  The principle of sociability takes society as the true state of nature.  
Mankind is made, and has always been made, for society; we are endowed with an instinctive 
fellow-feeling, and it is from this natural well of human benevolence that rights arise.  Within 
this moral framework, as Aaron Garrett explains, “[w]e have various duties and roles as humans, 
as parents, as parishioners, etc., which arise from different features of our human ‘frame’; they 
are natural to us, as sociable human beings who seek and need other human beings.”47  “Natural” 
                                                 
46 On the influence of the Scottish Enlightenment on American revolutionary ideology, see generally GARRY WILLS, 
INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON’S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 168-255 (1978); cf. generally WILLIAM J. 
NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE:  LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 19-50 (1996). But 
see Gordon S. Wood, “Influence’ in History” in THE PURPOSE OF THE PAST: REFLECTIONS ON THE USES OF HISTORY 
17-29 (2008) (reviewing GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST (1981)).  On “The Bonds of 
Affection” in early American history, see MELVIN YAZAWA, FROM COLONIES TO COMMONWEALTH: FAMILIAL 
IDEOLOGY AND THE BEGINNINGS OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 9-18 (1985); on “The Missing Dimension of 
Sociality” in modern law, see MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF SOCIAL DISCOURSE 
109-44 (1991). 
47 Aaron Garrett, Francis Hutcheson and the Origin of Animal Rights, 45 J. HIST. OF PHIL. 243, 249 (2007); cf. 
NATHANIEL CHIPMAN, SKETCHES OF THE PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT (1793) 34, cited in NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S 
WELFARE, supra note 46, at 34 (“The rights of man are relative to his social nature, and the rights of the individual 
exist, in a coincidence only with the rights of the whole, in a well-ordered state of society and civil.”); see also 
CHIPMAN, SKETCHES, 111–12 (“[Rights] arise in society and are relative to it.  Antecedently to that state, they could 
only exist potentially.  The rights of all have a reciprocal relation to the rights of each, and can never be rightly 
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rights, in other word, are a product of our social roles and their accompanying social obligations.  
They enable social beings to act on their natural sympathetic endowment, to carry out the duties 
attendant upon the roles that social beings naturally assume.  Garrett illustrates the idea this way:  
“We are granted a right to property, in order to feed our families and ourselves.  We have a right 
over our children, in order to teach them and help them to grow.”48  (Or, as Mark Hopkins, a 
professor of moral philosophy at Williams College from 1836 to 1872, put it, “A man has rights 
in order that he may do right.”49)   
 It is hardly surprising that moral theorists like Francis Hutcheson would tie the right to 
parent to the parent’s role as educational trustee.  It is the parent who teaches the child how to 
cultivate natural benevolence, doing do not just by direct instruction, but by example as well.  If 
benevolence is the source of public duty, its practice begins at home.  Its domestic starting point 
is the repudiation (as contrary to “natural justice”) of the ancient idea that the father possesses a 
sovereign power over family affairs.  “[The] grand end of the parental power,” Hutcheson writes, 
“shows that it includes few of those rights contained in the patria potestas of the Romans.  The 
child is a rational moral agent, with rights valid against the parents; though they are the natural 
tutors or curators, and have a right to direct the actions, and manage the goods of the child, for its 
benefit, during its want of proper knowledge.”50  Parental authority is a right only in the sense 
that a fiduciary has the right to fulfill his or her delegated social responsibility, assumed for the 
                                                                                                                                                             
apprehended, distinct from that relation”).  For a contemporary statement of this theme, we might turn to Michael 
Sandel: “The morality of right . . . speaks to that which distinguishes us, the morality of good corresponds to the 
unity of persons and speaks to that which connects us.” LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE 133 (1982); cf. 
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 256 (1986) (“The importance of liberal rights is in their service to the 
public good.”). 
48 Garrett, supra note 47, at 249. 
49 MARK HOPKINS, LECTURES ON MORAL SCIENCE 256 (1876) 256, cited in NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE, supra 
note 46, at 33.  For a recent effort to link rights and responsibilities, see generally JAMES E. FLEMING AND LINDA C. 
MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES (2013). 
50 FRANCIS HUTCHESON, A SYSTEM OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY 192 (Glasgow: R. and A. Foulis; London: A. Millar and 
T. Longman, 1755). 
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eventual enfranchisement of the child, and thus it is an authority limited in scope, time, and 
means.51     
 By the time of the Scottish Enlightenment, this focus on parenting as mentorship for a 
state of common sociability had a strong pedigree among natural rights theorists.  In On The 
Duty of Man and Citizen According to the Natural Law (1672), to cite one example, jurist and 
philosopher Samuel von Pufendorf declared that “the fundamental moral law is this:  that every 
man must cherish and maintain sociability, so far as in him lies.”52  It follows from this that “all 
things which necessarily and universally make for that sociability are understood to be ordained 
by natural law, and that confuse or destroy it forbidden.”53  Whether we think of the state of 
nature “either as it is represented by a figment, or as it really exists,”54 Pufendorf maintains, it is 
no sociable place.  It is a place of “equal immunity from all subjection” and thus equal subjection 
to “the rule of passion, war, fear, poverty, ugliness, solitude, barbarism, ignorance, savagery.”55  
Nasty, brutish, and short:  This is what natural liberty looks like, and we gladly exchange it for 
the “adventitious states,”56 the social bonds we cultivate as members of the civil state.  Because 
“[t]he nature of man is so constituted that the race cannot be preserved without the social life,”57 
                                                 
51 William Blackstone observes that, though sufficient to keep a child in order, “[t]he power of a parent by our 
English laws is much more moderate” than that prescribed by the municipal law of other nations.  Blackstone rejects 
a “very large and absolute authority” for the parent, insisting that the parent may “lawfully correct his child,” but 
only “in a reasonable manner.” Correction must be “for the benefit of [the child’s] education.”  The power of the 
parent is finite in duration as well as scope, for it is directed toward the time, that is, when “the empire of the father . 
. . gives place to the empire of reason.” The child is “enfranchised by arriving at years of discretion.” 1 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 440-41 (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1765). 
52 SAMUEL VON PUFENDORF, 2 ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO THE NATURAL LAW 19 (Frank 
Gardner Moore trans., William S. Hein & Co. 1682 ed. 1927) (1672?). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. at 90. 
55 Id. at 91. 
56 Id. at 104. 
57 Id. at 19. 
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the parent’s task is to “bring up children well, that they may turn out fit members of human 
society.”58   
 Pudendorf cites two main causes from which the authority of parents over their children 
arises.  First, the natural law “in commanding man to be social, enjoined upon parents the care of 
their children.”59  That parents might not neglect this care “[n]ature at the same time implanted in 
them the tenderest affection for their offspring.”60  The focus here is on parental duty, not 
parental right, as natural.  For the proper care of children, “there is needed the power to direct the 
actions of children,” but it is a power to direct, not control; and it is a power to direct the actions 
of children “for their own welfare, which they do not yet understand themselves, owing to their 
lack of judgment.”61  Second, Pufendorf contends that parental authority “rests upon the tacit 
consent also of the offspring.”  This is, needless to say, a presumed consent, but rightly presumed 
because   
if an infant had had the use of reason at the time of its birth, and had seen that it could not 
save its life without the parents’ care and the authority therewith connected, it would 
gladly have consented to it, and would in turn have made an agreement with them for a 
suitable bringing-up.62 
 
The parents’ authority, Pufendorf stresses, “is established when they take up the child and 
nurture it, and undertake to form it, to the best of their ability, into a fit member of human 
society.”  It is the nurturing task that provides the proper measure of parental authority.  Parents 
have “only so much authority . . . as suffices for this purpose.”63  This fiduciary model of the 
parent-child relationship would have great appeal to political theorists like John Locke and no 
                                                 
58 Id. at 98. 
59 Id. at 108. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 98. 
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little influence on the political temper and educational practices of the emerging American 
republic.64   
 It was John Millar’s accomplishment to bring natural law speculation about the origin of 
parental authority down to earth.  He did so by describing in historical terms how forms of 
authority, including parental authority, arise from and evolve in response to specific material 
conditions.  Millar’s The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks (1771; revised in 1779) has been 
hailed as “one of the most important works in all the history of family studies.”65  By looking at 
the family through the lens of “conjectural” history, Millar was able to present a history of 
personal rights as the product of social progress.  In his work, as Ronald L. Meek claims, “the 
new social science of the Enlightenment comes of age”:  “No one before Millar had ever used a 
materialist conception of history . . . so ably and so consistently to illuminate the development of 
such a wide range of social phenomena.”66   
                                                 
64 See SHULMAN, supra note 28, at 23-29, 39-36. 
65 Arland Thornton, John Millar and Other Scholars of the 1700s and 1800s Using the Developmental Paradigm, 
Reading History Sideways, and International Cross-Sectional Data to Reach Conclusions about Changes in Family 
Relationships and Practices [Preliminary Draft], 3, (2005), 
http://developmentalidealism.org/pubs/docs/thornton_JohnMillarOthersWorkingPaper.pdf. 
On Millar’s life and career, see LEHMAN, supra note 30, at  7-86; see also John Craig’s “Account of the Life and 
Writings of John Millar, Esq.,” which introduces the 1806 (4th) edition of The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks 
(see supra note 30).  For treatment of Millar’s work, see O’BRIEN, supra note 9, at 89-96; John Dwyer, Smith, 
Millar and the Natural History of Love, in THE AGE OF THE PASSIONS: AN INTERPRETATION OF ADAM SMITH AND 
SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT CULTURE 81-100 (1998); Michael Ignatieff, John Millar and Individualism, in WEALTH 
AND VIRTUE:  THE SHAPING OF POLITICAL ECONOMY IN THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT 317-43 (Istvan Holt and 
Michael Ignatieff eds., 1983); LEHMANN, supra note 30, at 89-163; Paul Bowles, Millar and Engels on the History 
of Women and the Family, 12 HIST. OF EUROPEAN IDEAS 595 (1990); Paul Bowles, John Millar, The Four-Stages 
Theory, and Women’s Position in Society, 16 HIST. OF POLITICAL ECON. 619 (1984); MEEK, supra note 9, at 160-76 
(1976).   
66 MEEK, supra note 9, at 161.  In his biographical account of Adam Smith, Dugald Stewart explains how 
conjectural history works: 
 
[We] are under the necessity of supplying the place of fact by conjecture; and when we are unable to 
ascertain how men have actually conducted themselves upon particular occasions, of considering in what 
manner they are likely to have proceeded, from the principles of their nature, and the circumstances of their 
external situation.  In such inquiries, the detached facts which travels and voyages afford us, may 
frequently serve as land-marks to our speculations; and sometimes our conclusions, a priori, may tend to 
confirm the credibility of facts, which on a superficial view, appear to be doubtful or incredible. . . . 
To this species of philosophical investigation, which has no appropriatedname in our language, I 
 shall take the liberty of giving the title Theoretical or Conjectural History. 
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 Though tender affection for one’s offspring may be a feature of human nature, the shape 
that that affection takes is, for Millar, a social phenomenon.  His treatment of family relations 
and the feelings that “belong” to them as the product of particular socioeconomic circumstances 
boldly rejects any idealistic notion of paternal mastery.  The husband is not the wife’s natural 
superior, nor does some higher law proclaim the parent to be the child’s natural guardian.  There 
is nothing “natural” about these relationships.  They evolve (or fail to) as society evolves (or fails 
to).67  Millar does speak of natural rights “which belong to mankind antecedent to the formation 
of civil society.” 68  In a state of nature, “we should be entitled to maintain our personal safety, to 
exercise our natural liberty, so far as it does not encroach upon the rights of others; and even to 
maintain a property in those things which we have come to possess, by original occupancy, or by 
our labour in producing them.”69  Yet if these rights are not entirely lost when we enter into 
society, they are “differently modified,” and a part of them is resigned “for the sake of those 
advantages to be derived from the social state.”70   
The genius of the social state, Millar writes, is to compensate us for the resignation of 
natural rights, and to burden us with restraints no greater “than are necessary for the general 
prosperity and happiness.”71  A political system may be “defective by too great strictness of 
regulation,” but, Millar hastens to add, more “have deviated widely from the purpose by too 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
DUGALD STEWART, ACCOUNT OF THE LIFE AND WRITINGS OF ADAM SMITH, in ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE 
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS lv (London, Charles Knight 1835). 
67 O’BRIEN, supra note 9, at 88, observes that although the sociological impulse led to a “highly contingent sense” of 
what is natural to human beings, this materialism “was often tempered by jurisprudential ascriptions of ‘naturalness’ 
to the historical process itself, or to a sense of underlying uniformity in the way that different societies experience 
each stage.”   
68 JOHN MILLAR, 4 AN HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE ENGLISH GOVERNMENT FROM THE SETTLEMENT OF THE SAXONS IN 
BRITAIN TO THE REVOLUTION OF 1688 294 (4th ed., London, J. Mawman 1818).  On Millar and natural law, see 
HAAKONSSEN, supra note 44, at 154-81. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. (Similarly, William Blackstone observes that even where a right arises from nature, “the particular 
circumstances and mode of doing it become right or wrong, as the laws of the land shall direct.” 1 COMMENTARIES, 
supra note 51, at 55.). 
71 Id. at 295. 
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great laxity.”72  And this laxity allows for a tyranny of individuals or of ranks that produces 
nothing “but a residue of despotism.”73 
[T]he greatest number [of political systems] have almost totally failed in producing 
happiness and security from the tyranny of individuals, or of particular orders and ranks, 
who, by . . . acquiring exorbitant power, have reduced their fellow-citizens into a state of 
servile subjection.74 
 
The same might be said of family “systems.”  Indeed, for Millar, the treatment of the family’s 
vulnerable members—women and children—serves as a barometer of social evolution.75  The 
tyranny of individuals in the private life of the family and the public life of the community—it is 
one and the same.76  The new cultural historiography of the eighteenth century (so reminiscent of 
the new historicism of the late twentieth century) made the interior life of the family, with its 
shifting social dynamics, as much the scholar’s business as are public affairs of state.   
 That family life and the course of its evolution are not identical from culture to culture 
Millar attributes to “the differences of situation, which have suggested different views and 
motives of action to the inhabitants of particular countries.”77  These differences of situation are 
the material conditions of culture:  “Of this kind, are the fertility or barrenness of the soil, the 
nature of its productions, the species of labour requisite for procuring subsistence, the number of 
individuals collected together in one community, their proficiency in arts, the advantages which 
they enjoy for entering into mutual transactions, and for maintaining an intimate 
                                                 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 296. 
74 Id. at 295. 
75 Cf. O’BRIEN, supra note 9, at 88 (“In many conjectural versions of history, the figure of the woman functioned as 
a barometer of social evolution, revealing the deep structure of each stage of development.”).  O’Brien writes that 
almost all Scottish writers “equated the sexual and political subjection of women with early, barbarous phases of 
development, and good treatment of them with the advance of civilization.” Id. 
76 Mary Catherine Moran, “The Commerce of the Sexes”: Gender and the Social Sphere in Scottish Enlightenment 
Accounts of Civil Society, in PARADOXES OF CIVIL SOCIETY: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON MODERN GERMAN AND BRITISH 
HISTORY 61 (Frank Trentmann ed., 2000).  Moran remarks that “Scottish Enlightenment accounts of the rise of civil 
society thus break down the distinction between public and private that is one of the founding assumptions of 
classical historiography.  The private concerns of household and economy are merged with the public concerns of 
government and polity in order to trace the progress of man through the various stages of society.” Id. at 68. 
77 MILLLAR, RANKS (3d ed.), supra note 30, at 175. 
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correspondence.”78  Such material circumstances—in effect, a people’s mode of subsistence—
Millar maintains, “have a prodigious influence upon the great body of a people.”79  Particular 
circumstances “giv[e] a peculiar direction” to a people’s inclinations and pursuits; they are 
“productive of correspondent habits, dispositions, and ways of thinking.”80   
 Particular circumstances notwithstanding, social progress, if unimpeded,  moves “from 
ignorance to knowledge, and from rude to civilized manners.”81  Advances in the the material 
world produce alterations in the moral world.   
By such gradual advances in rendering their situation more comfortable, the most 
important alterations are produced in the state and condition of a people: their numbers 
are increased; the connections of society are extended; and men, being less oppressed 
with their own wants, are more at liberty to cultivate the feelings of humanity: property, 
the great source of distinction among individuals, is established; and the various rights of 
mankind, arising from their multiplied connections, are recognised and protected: the 
laws of a country are thereby rendered numerous; and a more complex form of 
government becomes necessary, for distributing justice, and for preventing the disorders 
which proceed from the jarring interests and passions of a large and opulent 
community.82 
 
Human society, in other words, is the fruit of human cultivation—cultivation of the natural 
world, of the humane feelings—not the product of pre-social contracting.83  What is natural is the 
human capacity to civilize nature.  (Man “has in himself a principle of progression, and a desire 
for perfection,” writes Adam Ferguson in An Essay on the History of Civil Society (1767); so it is 
improper to say “that he has quitted the state of his nature, when he has begun to proceed; or that 
                                                 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 176. 
82 Id.  Millar borrowed from the four-fold model of Adam Smith. See ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 
210-21 (R. L. Meek, D. D. Raphael, & P. G. Stein eds., 1978); cf. J. G. A. Pocock, POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME 
102 (1973) (“[Stage-theorists] were able furthermore to relate the historicisation of property to the historicisation of 
social personality; as man moved through these successive phases of relationship with his environment, his social, 
political, and cultural needs and aptitudes, and with them his intellectual and imaginative capacities, changed 
accordingly.  A historical science of culture now seemed possible. . . .”). 
83 Cf. David Hume, Of the Original Contract (1748), in ESSAYS, MORAL, POLITICAL AND LITERARY 465-87 (Eugene 
F. Miller ed., Liberty Fund 1985). 
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he finds a station for which he was not intended, while, like other animals, he only follows the 
disposition, and employs the powers that nature has given.”84)  The natural order is the social 
order; the social order is the moral order, the order that is built on the human “disposition and 
capacity for improving [one’s] condition, by the exertion of which, he is carried on from one 
degree of advancement to another.”85  Thus, Garrett can describe the Ranks as “offer[ing] the 
elements of an empirical moral theory.”86  Daniel J. O’Neill puts it nicely when he writes that the 
theorists of the Scottish Enlightenment sought “to trace how human beings . . . developed a 
second nature in the move from ‘rude’ to ‘civil’ society, the latter state in some sense a 
convention, but a convention that was entirely natural to human beings, as ‘art itself is natural to 
man.’”87   
 Millar goes so far as to reject a concept that remains today one of the most commonplace 
of family law commonplaces:  that parents have a natural affection for the child that causes them 
to secure the child’s welfare.  Millar observes that “parental fondness . . . has been found so 
extensive and universal that it is commonly regarded as the effect of an immediate propensity,”88 
but the real origin of such solicitude is to be explained in historical and materialist terms.89  It is 
only to be expected that the father, as the head of his family, “should have an inclination to 
promote the welfare and prosperity of his children.”90  This inclination is reinforced by “[t]he 
helpless and miserable state in which [children] are produced,” which can hardly fail “to excite 
                                                 
84 ADAM FERGUSON, AN ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF CIVIL SOCIETY 14 (Fania Oz-Salzberger ed., Cambridge Univ. 
Press 1995) (1767). 
85 MILLAR, RANKS (3d ed.), supra note 30, at 176. 
86 Garrett, Introduction, supra note 30 at xvi; cf. O’NEILL, supra note 31, at 22-23 (“The basic goal of the Scottish 
Enlightenment was to establish what David Hume, one its leading lights, termed a ‘Science of Man’ applicable to 
the increasingly complex commercial societies of Europe.  The Scots sought a scientific understanding of individual 
ideas and beliefs as the key to understanding their social world and its historical development.  They aimed, that is, 
to provide an empirical account of human mental processes as the first step in analyzing human social arrangements 
and their development over time.”) (footnotes omitted). 
87 O’NEILL, supra note 31, at 34 (quoting FERGUSON, supra note 84, at 12). 
88 See MILLAR, RANKS (3d ed.), supra note 30, at 229-38. 
89 Ignatieff speaks of “the demolition of the ‘innateness’ of family feeling.” See Ignatieff, supra note 65, at 319-20. 
90 MILLAR, RANKS (3d ed.), supra note 30, at 229. 
24 
 
[the father’s] pity, and to solicit, in a peculiar manner, the protection of that person from whom 
they have derived their existence.”91  As children grow, the father “is more warmly engaged on 
their behalf in proportion to the efforts which he has made for their benefit, and his affection for 
them is increased by every new mark of his kindness.”92  Paternal fondness grows by the same 
behavioralistic principles as any relation of fondness does.93       
By retaining them afterwards in his family, which is the foundation of a constant 
intercourse, by procuring their assistance in the labour to which he is subjected, by 
connecting them with all his plans and views of interest, [the father’s] attachment is 
usually continued and strengthened from the same habits and principles which, in other 
cases, give rise to friendship or acquaintance.94 
 
 The “science” of stage-theory allowed Millar to chart the historical course of parent-child 
relations—and how that course led away from a primitive domestic patriarchalism.  The 
jurisdiction of the father, Millar notes, is of the same nature as that of the husband:  the power of 
the strong to oppress the weak.  In primitive societies, this authority is absolute.  The young child 
is entirely governed by “the severe and arbitrary will of the father.”95  This is hardly a matter of 
consent.  Children have no choice but to submit to the family sovereign. 
From their inferiority in strength, they are in no condition to dispute his commands; and 
being incapable of maintaining themselves, they depend entirely upon him for 
subsistence. To him they must apply for assistance, whenever they are exposed to danger, 
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or threatened with injustice; and looking upon him as the source of all their enjoyments, 
they have every motive to court his favour and to avoid his displeasure.96 
 
But it is not just children who suffer under the yoke of parental authority.  The adult who “has 
been accustomed from his infancy to serve and to obey his father”97 will carry with him—within 
him—the lasting effects of a childhood of acquiescence. 
Even after he is grown up, and has arrived at his full strength of body, and maturity of 
judgment, he retains the early impressions of his youth, and remains in a great measure 
under the yoke of that authority to which he has hitherto submitted.  He shrinks at the 
angry countenance of his father, and trembles at the power of that arm whose severe 
discipline he has so often experienced, and of whose valour and dexterity he has so often 
been a witness.  He thinks it the highest presumption to dispute the wisdom and propriety 
of those commands to which he has always listened, as to an oracle, and which he has 
been taught to regard as the infallible rule of his conduct.  He is naturally led to acquiesce 
in that jurisdiction which he has seen exerted on so many different occasions, and which 
he finds to be uniformly acknowledged by all the members of the family.98 
 
 It was the “gradual advancement of a people in civilized manners” that “limit[ed] and 
restrain[ed] this primitive jurisdiction.”99  One might think that these ameliorating circumstances 
softened the paternal character, made the father himself less despotic, Millar says, and to some 
extent this is the case.  In a life of affluence and security, the father can afford to moderate his 
power and “to cultivate those arts which tend to soften and humanize the temper”;100 engaged in 
a world of business and social intercourse, the father perforce had to “conform[] to the humours 
of those with whom he converses,” to become more patient of being contradicted, and less apt to 
indulge in bouts of passion.101  Yet such humanizing is not the first reason Millar advances for 
greater restraint on the part of the family patriarch.  Millar notes that “[w]hen different families 
are united in a larger society,” the father conducts himself on a less private stage.  His actions 
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will “excite the attention of the public.”  And this publicness will subject the father to the 
scrutiny of others who have a concern for the welfare of the child. 
When different families are united in a larger society, the several members of which have 
an intimate correspondence with each other, it may be expected that the exercise of 
domestic authority will begin to excite the attention of the public.  The near relations of a 
family, who have a concern for the welfare of the children, and who have an opportunity 
of observing the manner in which they are treated, will naturally interpose by their good 
offices, and endeavour to screen them from injustice and oppression. The abuses which, 
on some occasions, are known and represented with all their aggravating circumstances, 
will excite indignation and resentment, and will at length give rise to such regulations as 
are necessary for preventing the like disorders for the future.102 
 
 What is more, progress brings about a weakening of the father’s power, allowing other 
members of the family to raise themselves “to a state of freedom and independence.”103  In 
nations that have made the greatest economic advances, “great liberty is enjoyed by the members 
of every family; and the children are no farther subjected to the father than seems necessary for 
their advantage.”104  The introduction of “commerce and manufactures” tends to disperse 
members of the family; children leave home to learn a profession and earn a livelihood, and, in 
the process, “are put in a condition to procure a maintenance without having recourse to the 
[father’s] bounty.”105  The paternal jurisdiction is “reduced within narrower bounds, in 
proportion to the ordinary improvements of society.”106  By material necessity, Millar writes, 
children “are emancipated from their father’s authority.”107  Indeed, Millar concludes his 
discussion of parental jurisdiction by cautioning against the tendency of a commercial age to a 
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lessening of parental authority of such magnitude that it threatens “proper domestic 
subordination.”108 
 The language of “proper” domestic jurisdiction reminds us that, for Millar, the parent 
should have only the degree of authority consistent with “[t]he interest of those who are 
governed.”109  Like mankind in general, the child must be allowed to follow the natural course of 
human maturation from infancy to adulthood.110  This interest “is the chief circumstance which 
ought to regulate the powers committed to a father, as well as those committed to a civil 
magistrate.”111  More authority than this is not proper.  Whenever the prerogative of the 
magistrate, familial or paternal, “is further extended than is requisite for this great end, it 
immediately degenerates into usurpation, and is to be regarded as a violation of the natural rights 
of mankind.”112  Echoing Locke’s equation of public and private patriarchalism, Millar takes a 
(somewhat gratuitous) swipe at Locke’s nemesis, Sir Robert Filmer, “who found[ed] the doctrine 
of passive obedience to a monarch, upon the unlimited submission which children owe to their 
father.”113  This, Millar contends, is a position that refutes itself.  “To say that a king ought to 
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enjoy absolute power because a father has enjoyed it,” he argues, “is to defend one system of 
oppression by the example of another.”114  
 “By focusing on familial rights,” Garrett observes, “Millar brought the problem of natural 
rights into sharp focus.”115  Millar’s ethnohistory of the family, his “stadial genealogy of 
particular rights” (Garrett’s phrase), is built on the notion that rights ought to be construed as 
social, not individualistic; as dynamic, not static.116  If the natural condition of human life is 
social, then, as O’Neil remarks, “‘natural rights’ have to be discussed within the context of 
natural sociability”; they cannot “be divorced either conceptually or normatively from social 
existence.”117  For Millar, this is as true of the right to parent as any other.  The nature and scope 
of parental authority, grounded as they are on the educative role of the parent, evolve in response 
to the changing material conditions and moral circumstances of social life.  Even this most 
“natural” of rights is artificial; even this most personal of rights is socially constructed.  If this is 
so, Garrett is right to ask the question inevitably, if implicitly, posed by John Millar’s empirical 
moral theory:  “What is one to make of natural rights at all?”118   
 
 
II 
 
Henry Maine and Herbert Spencer: 
 
Anti-Patriarchalism and the Libertarian State 
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 The work of comparative historical jurisprudence was carried on by nineteenth-century 
libertarian legal scholars and social theorists, though it was sometimes carried to places where 
the moral sentiments of the Scottish Enlightenment were left far behind.  In British and 
American law, contractualist and libertarian-minded writers relied on stage-theory to outline a 
course of progress marked by a growing commitment to individual rights.  As free-market 
economics and pseudo-Darwinian theory gained a hold on jurisprudential trends, social progress 
would be increasingly identified with the protection of personal rights from the reach of the 
paternalistic state.  (Think Adam Smith of The Wealth of Nations divorced from Adam Smith of 
The Theory of Moral Sentiments.119)  One would assume that the libertarian theorists of the 
second half of the nineteenth century, with their gaze concentrated on personal freedom, would 
consistently support a strong regime of parental rights.  But this is not the case.  It is largely 
forgotten, or largely ignored, by those who posit a longstanding heritage for parental rights that 
some influential anti-statists also objected to paternal authoritarianism as incompatible with the 
progress of liberty.     
 Sir Henry Maine is familiar to students today—if, indeed, he is familiar—for his 
contractualist reading of legal and social history.  Herbert Spencer is perhaps known as a rights 
theorist who bore the brunt of Justice Holmes’ considerable powers of caustic comment.  Today, 
these writers find themselves subsumed in the general animosity to all things Lochnerian.  It 
would be more accurate to say almost all things, for one aspect of Lochnerian jurisprudence has 
had a celebrated, if not uncontroversial, legacy.  It was the Lochner-era Court that pointed out 
the means by which unenumerated rights would make their constitutional appearance; and while 
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the use of substantive due process to guarantee economic liberties, such as the right to contract, 
in time would fall out of favor (though not entirely disappear120), the personal rights heritage of 
Meyer and Pierce would lie dormant, only to flourish in a second coming of unenumerated 
rights. 
   
A 
Henry Maine 
 Sir Henry Maine was, to use his own comparison, something of a juridical geologist.121  
For him, the rudimentary ideas of the ancients were “what the primary crusts of the earth are to 
the geologist,” an empirical record of our own legal lineage.122  And a far more useful record 
than metaphysical speculation about a Law of Nature or the unverifiable assumptions of Social 
Compact.123  It is only upon a base of “sober research into the primitive history of society and 
law,”124 Maine concludes, that a science of jurisprudence can be founded. 
 For Maine, the path of social progress is the path away from patriarchalism.125  In the 
“infancy of the race, men could only account for sustained or periodically recurring action by 
supposing a personal agent.”126  The wind, the sun, the earth were divine persons.  So, too, in the 
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moral world, where the king adjudicated disputes by divine inspiration, “[a] supernatural 
presidency is supposed to consecrate and keep together all the cardinal institutions of those 
times, the State, the Race, and the Family.”127  The rule of the patriarch was more akin, in 
Maine’s words, to commands—and capricious ones at that—than to laws.128  In time, the 
authority of the king “gave way to the dominion of aristocracies,” political or religious ruling 
councils of chiefs who usurped the royal lawmaking role.129  This conciliar rule was not 
legitimated “by supposing an extra-human interposition.”130  Rather, the claim of the “juristical 
oligarchy . . . [was] to monopolize the knowledge of the laws, to have the exclusive possession of 
principles by which quarrels are decided.”131  From monopolistic authority we move to the great 
epoch of public codes, which might afford protection “against the frauds of the privileged 
oligarchy and also against the debasement of the national institutions.”132  But the laws of social 
development do not guarantee what Maine calls the “upward march” of society.133  The codes 
themselves can act as a form of patriarchal despotism—reifying ancient superstitions, rendering 
the law little more than a fetishistic observance—to be obeyed as servilely as the most despotic 
of rulers. 
 Like state, like family.  The evolution of the family, too, follows the path away from 
patriarchalism.  The “natural” family is itself a legal fiction, Maine observes.  In tracing the 
origin of society, he remarks that it would a simple explanation to “suppose that communities 
began to exist wherever a family held together instead of separating at the death of its patriarchal 
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chieftain.”134  The assumption that “kinship in blood is the sole possible ground of 
community”135 held fast as Families aggregated to form Houses, Houses aggregated to form 
Tribes, and, finally, Tribes aggregated to form the Commonwealth.136  Members of the 
Commonwealth owed their political status, it was presumed, to a common blood line.  But, 
according to Maine, this fundamental assumption was false.137  In fact, the family was not held 
together by blood, but by the admission of others outside the blood line.  The family “was being 
constantly adulterated by the practice of adoption,”138 that is, by “the absorption of strangers 
within its circle.”139  From Family to House to Tribe to Commonwealth, the composition of 
society, though assumed to be natural, was, in fact, “in great measure artificial.”140   
 Though not descended from a common ancestor, the members of the family nonetheless 
used this fiction to hold together the primary social unit.  The theory of common descent cloaked 
the practical reality of “common obedience to the[] highest living ascendant.”141  The family was 
the “empire of its ruler,” held together by the patriarchal authority of its chieftain, the type of 
command most commonly known by its Roman name, Patria Potestas.142  “It is this patriarchal 
aggregate,” claims Maine, “which meets us on the threshold of primitive jurisprudence.”143  In 
the early stage of the family empire, the father—or, more precisely, the eldest male parent—
governed a true “domestic despotism.”  His word was law, his dominion supreme.  The father 
held over his children the power of life and death, of uncontrolled corporal punishment, of 
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dictating marriage and divorce; and like the rest of the father’s property, the child could be sold 
or transferred by adoption.   
 Change in family law—here, as elsewhere, Maine relies on the law of ancient Rome—
was slow in coming.  When it did come, Maine argues, it was part of a greater alteration in what 
might be called legal ontology.  The ancient law was “binding not on individuals, but on 
Families.”144  According to Maine, ancient family lawmaking reached only to the paternal head 
of the family.  To every other family member, “the rule of conduct is the law of his home, of 
which his Parent is the legislator.”145  The ancient law is thus “so framed as to be adjusted to a 
system of small independent corporations,” each family being “perpetual and 
inextinguishable.”146  Yet, as Millar suggested, the public sphere, with all its legal apparatus and 
social pressure, tends to enlarge its scope, and encroachments upon the family’s private domain 
are inevitable:  “[A]t every point of the progress, a greater number of personal rights and a larger 
amount of property are removed from the domestic forum to the cognizance of the public 
tribunals.”147  
 In Roman law, Maine finds “a nearly complete history of of the crumbling away of an 
archaic system.”148  Like a child, the law grew up by leaving behind a code of obedience to 
paternal dictum, and “a new morality . . . displaced the canons of conduct and the reasons of 
acquiescence which were in unions with the ancient usages.”149  The new morality made the 
individual, not the family, “the unit of which civil law takes account”; it made individual 
obligation, not family dependency, the measure of the law’s binding power.150  The hallmark of 
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social progress is a legal regime in which rights and duties are defined by contract, the free 
agreement of free individuals.  “Starting, as from one terminus of history, from a condition of 
society in which all the relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of Family,” Maine 
claims, “we seem to have steadily moved towards a phase of social order in which all these 
relations arise from the free agreement of individuals.”151 
 As the slave is superseded by the servant, as the woman is freed from paternal tutelage 
(though not, Maine seems to say, from the tutelage of her husband152), “[s]o too the status of the 
Son under Power has no true place in the law.”153  Of course, when the child lacks the capacity to 
judge his or her own best interests, the principle of contract cannot apply, but beyond this, “[i]f 
any civil obligation binds together the Parent and the child of full age, it is one to which only 
contract gives its legal validity.”154  Maine is not sure what causes “helped to mitigate the 
stringency of the father’s power over the persons of his children.”155  Interestingly, he suggests 
that the circumscribed empire of the father perforce gave way to the needs of Rome’s vast 
colonial Empire.  The constant wars of conquest must have resulted in the unwillingness of sons 
“to regard themselves as the slaves of a despotic master.”156  If the family was “an imperium in 
imperio,”157 the route of escape from paternal despotism may have run from empire to Empire.    
 In work subsequent to Ancient Law, as David Rabban points out, Maine tempered his 
frequent assertions . . . about the ubiquity of the patriarchal family in primitive societies,”158 
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assertions that had not gone unchallenged.159  But Maine’s legacy does not rest on scientific 
rigor.  His historical jurisprudence (which meant the rejection of theoretical abstractions and 
speculation about the state of nature), his evolutionary understanding of cultural norms, his 
sociology of power relations—it was on these bases that Maine made such a strong, if relatively 
short-lived, contribution to the study of law.  And it was on these ethnological underpinnings that 
other pioneers in the study of law and society, of various stripes, would build their own 
jurisprudential structures. 
 
B 
Herbert Spencer 
 
 Unlike Millar and Maine, Herbert Spencer begins his sociological inquiries by deducing 
first principles of social morality.  “Social” morality because, for Spencer, mankind’s social state 
is an unalterable fact, a necessity of being.160  These first principles or laws, from which there is 
no rational appeal, have their origin in mankind’s impulse to right action—in the Moral Sense.  
Though human nature is always changing, always adapting itself to changing circumstances, the 
Moral Sense leads us to nature’s unchanging moral rules.  These operate with a systematic 
constancy equal to the universal and inevitable forces of the physical world—with, Spencer 
would say, the unvaryingness that is an essential attribute of the Divine Will.  Thus, Spencer 
speaks of his work as an effort to understand the moral world as one would the physical:  
scientifically.161   
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 The essence of a scientific morality is to understand the process by which mankind is 
“moulded into fitness” for the necessary conditions of life,162 and it is here that Spencer drinks 
deeply of comparative jurisprudential history.  Put simply, he links his philosophical speculations 
to a progressive sociological history.  The more obedient we are to the Divine Will—in other 
words, the more adapted our society becomes to nature’s laws—the freer we are.  This, for 
Spencer, is social progress.  And mankind, he insists, is a work in progress.  Why, he asks, “is 
not man adapted to the social state?”  His answer: 
 Simply because he yet partially retains the characteristics that adapted him for an 
antecedent state.  The respects in which he is not fitted to society are the respects in 
which he is fitted for his original predatory life.  His primitive circumstances required 
that he should sacrifice the welfare of other beings to his own; his present circumstances 
require that he should not do so; and in as far as his old attribute still clings to him, in so 
far is he unfit for the social state. . . .  
 Concerning the present position of the human race, we must therefore say, that 
man needed one moral constitution to fit him for his original state; that he needs another 
to fit him for his present state; and that he has been, is, and will long continue to be, in 
process of adaptation.  By the term civilization we signify the adaptation that has already 
taken place.  The changes that constitute progress are the successive steps of the 
transition.  And the belief in human perfectibility, merely amounts to the belief, that in 
virtue of this process, man will eventually become completely suited to his mode of 
life.163 
Originally fitted for a predatory life, one where we sacrifice the happiness of other beings to our 
own, mankind must adapt to the moral necessities of a social state.  The musculature of the 
Moral Sense grows by use—Lamarck, not Darwin, guides the way—and will do so until 
mankind is “moulded into complete fitness for the social state.”164  Then, there will be no need 
for government to render justice, whether government acts through “the gentle whisperings of 
benevolence” or “the harsh threats of law.”165   
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Thus, as civilization advances, does government decay.  To the bad it is essential; to the 
good, not.  It is the check which national wickedness makes to itself, and exists only to 
the same degree.  Its continuance is proof of still-existing barbarism.  What a cage is to 
the wild beast, law is to the selfish man.  Restraint is for the savage, the rapacious, the 
violent; not for the just, the gentle, the benevolent.  All necessity for external force 
implies a morbid state.  Dungeons for the felon; a strait-jacket for the maniac; crutches 
for the lame; stays for the weak-backed; for the infirm of purpose a master; for the foolish 
a guide; but for the sound mind, in a sound body, none of these.  Were there no thieves 
and murderers, prisons would be unnecessary.  It is only because tyranny is yet rife in the 
world that we have armies.  Barristers, judges, juries—all the instruments of law—exist, 
simply because knavery exists.  Magisterial force is the sequence of social vice; and the 
policeman is but the complement of the criminal. Therefore it is that we call government 
“a necessary evil.”166 
 
When the human faculties are “moulded into complete fitness for the social state,” there will be 
no need for the state to restrain the wicked—or to support the poor, or to protect the consumer, or 
regulate commerce, or to educate the young.  These “mechanical” measures, so Spencer argues, 
only retard the growth of the sympathetic faculty—the charity prompted by the heart—that is the 
hallmark of social progress.167  There will be no need for government at all.  The, it must be that 
“the things we call evil and immorality will disappear; so surely must man become perfect.”168 
 We must follow, Spencer reminds us, where scientific morality leads.  First, we must 
listen to the monitions of the Moral Sense, to this “instinct of personal rights—a feeling that 
leads [each of us] to claim as great a share of natural privilege as is claimed by others”—a 
feeling that leads mankind to repel anything like an encroachment upon personal freedom.169  
This instinct is a purely selfish one, “leading each man to assert and defend his own liberty of 
action”;170 but it is through this same “instrumentality” of the Moral Sense that “we receive 
satisfaction on paying another what is due to him.”171  Justice, that is, “is nothing but a 
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167 See id. at 341-60. 
168 Id. at 80. 
169 Id. at 110. 
170 Id. at 114.   
171 Id. at 116. 
38 
 
sympathetic affection of the instinct of personal rights—a sort of reflex function of it.”172  From 
this yoking together of Self and Sympathy emerges the law of equal freedom:  “Every man has 
freedom to do all that he wills, provided he infringes not the equal freedom of any other man.”173  
Second, we must adapt so that we are fitted to the law.  Because it is derived “directly” from the 
Divine Will, the law of equal freedom “is of higher authority than all other laws.”174  It is 
absolute moral law.  All man-made institutions, all merely social forms, are subordinate to it; 
they must “marshal themselves as it commands.”175  There is no safety, he writes, “but in entire 
obedience” to this principle.176   
 Spencer insists on this point because some of the conclusions “inevitably following” from 
them will seem strange or impracticable.177  This is a warning he is at pains to make again before 
turning to a discussion of parental authority.  If “that first principle from which rights are 
derived, turns out to be a source from which we may derive the rights of children,” he cautions, 
“we have no choice but to abide by the result.”178  The caution is warranted, Spencer contends, 
because the demonstration of equal liberty “is fully as complete when used on behalf of the 
child, as when used on behalf of the man.”179  To get here, Spencer retraces the basic steps of his 
moral philosophy: 
  1.  God wills human happiness. 
  2.  Happiness is attainable only through the use of our faculties. 
  3.  For the production of happiness, these faculties must be exercised. 
                                                 
172 Id. 
173 Id. at 121. 
174 Id. at 217-18. 
175 Id. at 218. The law of equal liberty “dates from creation; [all other institutions and social forms] are of yesterday.  
It is constant; they are changeable.  It appertains to the perfect; they to the imperfect.  It is coenduring with 
humanity; they may die tomorrow.  As surely then as the incidental must bow before the necessary, so surely must 
all conventional arrangements be subject to the absolute moral law.” See id. 
176 Id. at 65. 
177 Id. at 65. 
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  4.  The exercise of these faculties presupposes liberty of action.180 
 
 “The child’s happiness, too, is willed by the Deity,” Spencer maintains; “the child, too, has 
faculties to be exercised; the child, too, needs scope for the exercise of those faculties.”181  And, 
therefore, the child “has claims to freedom—rights as we call them—coextensive with those of 
the adult.  We cannot avoid this conclusion, if we would.”182  
 Like Millar, Spencer treats parent-child relations as part of history’s grand procession. 
Social progress occurs—simultaneously, and at the same pace—on two fronts:  the family and 
the state.  “Despotism in the state,” Spencer asserts, “is necessarily associated with despotism in 
the family.  The two being alike moral in their origin, cannot fail to coexist.”183  Indeed, and here 
we find an echo of the Scottish Enlightenment, the condition of a people can be judged by how 
its most vulnerable members—women and children—are treated, publicly and privately:  “To the 
same extent that the triumph of might over right is seen in a nation’s political institutions, it is 
seen in its domestic ones.”184  Spencer applauds the fact that society was sloughing off the 
ancient subordination of women (though too slowly; as an advocate of full political and social 
rights for women, Spencer knew there was much work left to be done).  Gender subordination 
“implies the use of command,” according to Spencer, and whenever authority has to use the 
voice of command—to use, as Spencer puts it, “the modern forms of bygone despotism and 
slavery”— it “reveals its descent from barbarism.”185   
The desire to command is essentially a barbarous desire. . . . Command cannot be 
otherwise than savage, for it implies an appeal to force, should force be needful.  Behind 
its “You Shall,” there lies the scarcely hidden, “If you won’t, I’ll make you.”  Command 
is the growl of coercion crouching in ambush.  Or we might aptly term it—violence in a 
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183 Id. at 179. 
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latent state.  All its accessories—its frown, its voice, its gestures, prove it akin to the 
ferocity of the uncivilized man.  Command is the foe of peace, for it breeds war of words 
and feelings—sometimes of deeds.  It is inconsistent with the first law of morality.  It is 
radically wrong.186 
 
 Spencer defines despotism “as the making of another’s will bend to the fulfillment of our 
own”; slavery is simply despotism’s counterpart:  “having our will subordinated to the will of 
another.”187  Though we usually use these terms “only when the rule of one will over another is 
extreme,” Spencer refuses to let the petty autocrat escape moral censure just because his rule 
does not take the most oppressive form:  “[I]f the subjection of man to man is bad when carried 
to its full extent, it is bad in any degree.”188  The “arbitrary rule of one human being over 
another” must be rejected, “no matter in what form it may appear.”189   
 Even when it appears in the form of parental care.  By way of  analogy to marital 
relations, Spencer looks at parent-child relations with an unsentimental eye:  “If it be true that the 
dominion of man over woman has been oppressive in proportion to the badness of the age or the 
people, it is also true that parental authority has been stringent and unlimited in a like 
proportion.”190  Spencer sees, as mentioned, an oppressive harmony “between the political, 
connubial, and filial relationships,”191 the common denominator being the use of coercion, 
prompted by selfishness and moral blindness.  But Spencer has a special antipathy toward the 
assertion of paternal control:  “Uncover its roots, and the theory of paternal authority will be 
found not to grow out of man’s love for his offspring but out of his love of dominion.”192 
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 It is paternal authority that Spencer considers “the main obstacle to the right conduct of [a 
child’s] education.”193  Spencer thinks that education, properly understood, is a leading away 
from dependency—this is what he means by the development of “character”—but coercive 
parenting is utterly unfit for this task.  Instead of changing character, “coercion can manifestly do 
nothing but forcibly mould externals into a coarse semblance of such a state.”194  Coercion can 
only change conduct.  Here, too, Spencer treats the state and the family as analogous:  “In the 
family, as in society, [coercion] can simply restrain; it cannot educate.”195  Left alone, children 
might somehow find their way to maturity, but they are not left alone.  They are mis-educated, 
taught by example the lessons of selfishness, taught what Spencer calls the “evil disposition” to 
sacrifice the happiness of others to our own.196   
Fathers and mothers who enlarge upon the trouble which filial misbehaviour entails upon 
them, strangely assume that all the blame is due to the evil propensities of their offspring 
and none to their own.  Though on their knees they confess to being miserable sinners, 
yet to hear their complaints of undutiful sons and daughters you might suppose that they 
were themselves immaculate.197 
 
Of course, parents are not immaculate.  They issue commands “for their own convenience or 
gratification,” rather than for “corrective purposes.”198  They enact a new era of old despotism 
and slavery, where parental power (“the ire of an offended ruler”) is substituted for moral force.  
Observe, too, the impulse under which a refractory child is punished.  Instead of anxiety 
for the delinquent’s welfare, that severe eye and compressed lip denote rather the ire of 
an offended ruler—express some inward thought as “You little wretch, we’ll soon see 
who is to be master. . . . Let any one who doubts this listen to that common reprimand, 
“How dare you disobey me?” and then consider what the emphasis means.199 
                                                 
193 Id. at 210. 
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It is not that what Spencer calls “moral-force education” is impracticable; it is that parents are 
not “civilized enough to use it.”200 
 Spencer saw signs, in modern society and the modern family, that times were changing.  
“[T]he decline in the rigour of paternal authority and in the severity of political oppression,” he 
remarks, “has been simultaneous.”201  The rapid growth of “democratic feeling” was 
accompanied “by a tendency toward systems of non-coercive education—that is, toward a 
practical admission of the rights of children.”202  But not, Spencer hastens to add, the rights of 
parents.  Whatever claim parental care establishes for the parent, it establishes “no title of 
dominion.”203  However solicitous parents are in the fulfillment of their obligations, they obtain 
no right thereby “to play the master” over the child.204 
 
 
IV 
 
Meyer, Pierce, and the Specter of the Paternalistic State 
 
 
 The specter of the socialist state was no new bogeyman when Arthur Mullen stood before 
the Supreme Court to denounce “the principle of the soviet.”  It was state control of the economy 
that drew cries of socialist menace at the turn of the nineteenth century.  But for the prime 
movers of socialism, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, it was not just private property that was 
holding back progress toward a truly egalitarian state.  It was the private family as well.  
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Working within the sociohistorical tradition of the Scottish Enlightenment,205 Marx and Engels 
saw the “freedoms” of the libertarian minimalist state as but a stage, and a barbaric one at that, 
that would be superseded, both materially and morally, by a higher stage where mankind would 
be liberated from all patriarchal relations.206  As others have pointed out, Marx criticized Maine 
                                                 
205 On the Scottish Enlightenment and historical materialism, see Meek, supra note 9, at 270-320; ARNAND C. 
CHITNIS, THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT: A SOCIAL HISTORY 118 (1976). 
206 See Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (Chapter 2), in 1 MARX/ENGELS SELECTED WORKS 
123-24 (Moscow, Progress Publishers 1969) (1848): 
Abolition of the family!  Even the most radical flare up at this infamous proposal of the Communists.  
On what foundation is the present family, the bourgeois family, based?  On capital, on private gain.  In its 
completely developed form, this family exists only among the bourgeoisie.  But this state of things finds its 
complement in the practical absence of the family among the proletarians, and in public prostitution.  
The bourgeois family will vanish as a matter of course when its complement vanishes, and both will vanish 
with the vanishing of capital.  
Do you charge us with wanting to stop the exploitation of children by their parents?  To this crime we plead 
guilty.  
But, you say, we destroy the most hallowed of relations, when we replace home education by social.  
And your education!  Is not that also social, and determined by the social conditions under which you 
educate, by the intervention direct or indirect, of society, by means of schools, &c.?  The Communists have 
not invented the intervention of society in education; they do but seek to alter the character of that 
intervention, and to rescue education from the influence of the ruling class.  
The bourgeois clap-trap about the family and education, about the hallowed co-relation of parents and 
child, becomes all the more disgusting, the more, by the action of Modern Industry, all the family ties 
among the proletarians are torn asunder, and their children transformed into simple articles of commerce 
and instruments of labour.  
But you Communists would introduce community of women, screams the bourgeoisie in chorus.  
The bourgeois sees his wife a mere instrument of production.  He hears that the instruments of production 
are to be exploited in common, and, naturally, can come to no other conclusion that the lot of being 
common to all will likewise fall to the women.  
He has not even a suspicion that the real point aimed at is to do away with the status of women as mere 
instruments of production.  
For the rest, nothing is more ridiculous than the virtuous indignation of our bourgeois at the community of 
women which, they pretend, is to be openly and officially established by the Communists.  The 
Communists have no need to introduce community of women; it has existed almost from time immemorial.  
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“for not recognizing that in progressive societies individualism would be superseded by 
collectivism, for not being enough of an evolutionist to recognize that evolution would reach 
later and better stages.”207     
 Working within its own variant of stage theory, communist ideology made the dissolution 
of the family the last step of the upward march of society.208  Marx and Engels were not the first 
to imagine the abolition of the family.  Nineteenth-century communitarians had envisioned new 
family structures,209 but where earlier Utopians like Charles Fourier and Robert Owen saw the 
abolition of the family as a means to liberate natural desire, Marx and Engels “held forth the 
hope that, instead of submitting to nature, communist society would be shaped by humans freely 
creating.  People would no longer be subject to what is natural.”210  Marx and Engels wanted a 
new human nature brought into being by new political constitutions.  As Richard Weikart writes, 
the decisive move of communist theory was a “move away from the naturalism of their 
predecessors.”211  What was natural was to coerce, and utopian social arrangements could render 
human relationships free from the dictates of nature.  Including the relationship of parent to 
child.  “Even if people had a natural bond to their children,” Weikart observes, “no provision 
                                                                                                                                                             
Our bourgeois, not content with having wives and daughters of their proletarians at their disposal, not to 
speak of common prostitutes, take the greatest pleasure in seducing each other’s wives.  
Bourgeois marriage is, in reality, a system of wives in common and thus, at the most, what the Communists 
might possibly be reproached with is that they desire to introduce, in substitution for a hypocritically 
concealed, an openly legalised community of women.  For the rest, it is self-evident that the abolition of the 
present system of production must bring with it the abolition of the community of women springing from 
that system, i.e., of prostitution both public and private.  
207 RABBAN, supra note 158, at 146 (footnote omitted); see also Alan D. J. Macfarlane, Some Contributions of 
Maine to History and Anthropology, in THE VICTORIAN ACHIEVEMENT OF SIR HENRY MAINE:  A CENTENNIAL 
REAPPRAISAL, supra note 125 at 134-35.  
208 See generally Richard Weikart, Marx, Engels, and the Abolition of the Family, 18 HIST. OF EUROPEAN IDEAS 657, 
669 (1994).  
209 See, e.g., J. F. C. HARRISON, QUEST FOR THE NEW MORAL ORDER: ROBERT OWEN AND THE OWENITES IN BRITAIN 
AND AMERICA 54-62 (1969). 
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would be made for this in communist society.”212  The public domain would not just check 
domestic patriarchalism; it would altogether abolish the hold of the parent on the child. 
 So Mullen knew what he was about.   
 What Robert Meyer wanted was modest enough:  the “right to teach . . . foreign 
languages and other branches in addition to the curriculum required by the public schools.”213  
Meyer, who was a school teacher at a parochial school, had framed the case as implicating his 
due process rights to pursue a calling and to enter into contracts.  Here, as in Pierce, the parents 
upset by state educational regulations were not parties to the litigation.  But Mullen was betting 
that the Court would take a broader view of the interests at stake.  He was right.  Writing for the 
Court, Justice McReynolds was not reluctant to widen the field of constitutional inquiry:  
“Evidently the Legislature has attempted materially to interfere with the calling of modern 
language teachers, with the opportunities of pupils to acquire knowledge, and with the power of 
parents to control the education of their own.”214  Of these three interferences, as it turned out, it 
was the last would count most. 
 Concern about a state educational monopoly had been voiced before by the courts.  By 
1918 all states had passed compulsory school attendance legislation, and state enforcement 
mechanisms were increasingly efficient.  The success of such laws prompted a number of rights-
based challenges to state control of education.  For the most part, these constitutional claims met 
only modest success.  Direct assaults on the state’s power to mandate compulsory school 
attendance were rejected on the familiar ground that “[t]he natural rights of a parent to the 
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213 Transcript of Oral Argument, Meyer v. Nebraska, supra note 2, at 11. 
214 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).  In Pierce, as James Dwyer notes, “attorneys thought to assert a 
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custody and control of his infant child are subordinate to the power of the state, and may be 
restricted and regulated by municipal laws.”215  Indeed, as the Supreme Court of Indiana 
maintained, what was truly “natural” was the fiduciary educational duty of the parent: 
One of the most important natural duties of the parent is his obligation to educate his 
child, and this duty he owes not to the child only, but to the commonwealth.  If he 
neglects to perform it or willfully refuses to do so, he may be coerced by law to execute 
such civil obligation.  The welfare of the child and the best interests of society require 
that the state shall exert its sovereign authority to secure to the child the opportunity to 
acquire an education.216 
 
 Yet several late-nineteenth-century courts, seeking some check on state regulation of the 
family, did uphold parental challenges to specific courses that were a (sometimes required, 
                                                 
215 State v. Bailey, 61 N.E. 730, 731-32 (Ind. 1901); cf. State v. Clottu, 33 Ind. 409 (1870) (“The matter of education 
is deemed a legitimate function of the state, and with us is imposed upon the legislature as a duty by imperative 
provisions of the constitution. . . .  In some countries, and even in some of our American states, education has for 
more than a century been made compulsory upon the parent, by the infliction of direct penalties for its neglect.  The 
right of the parent to ruin his child either morally or physically has no existence in nature.  The subject has always 
been regarded as within the purview of legislative authority.”); Stephens v. Bongart, 189 A. 131, 132 (N.J. Juv. & 
Dom. Rel. 1937) (“This statute is a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state.  The object of the legislation 
was to create an enlightened American citizenship in sympathy with our principles and ideals, and to prevent 
children reared in America from remaining ignorant and illiterate.  If it is within the police power of the state to 
regulate wages, to legislate respecting housing conditions in crowded cities, to prohibit dark rooms in tenement 
houses, to compel landlords to place windows in their tenements which will enable their tenants to enjoy the 
sunshine, it is within the police power of the state to compel every resident of New Jersey so to educate his children 
that the light of American ideals will permeate the life of our future citizens.”); State v. Williams, 56 S.D. 370 
(1929). 
216 State v. Bailey, 61 N.E. at 732.  In the 1886 case State v. Webber, the Indiana state supreme court found nothing 
arbitrary in the enforcement of state educational requirements.  “The power to establish graded schools carries with 
it, of course,” the court pointed out, “the power to establish and enforce such reasonable rules as may seem 
necessary to the trustees, in their discretion, for the government and discipline of such schools, and prescribing the 
course of instruction therein.” 8 N.E. 708, 711 (Ind. 1886).  It was the will of the parent that smacked of 
arbitrariness, and the state was under no obligation to accommodate it. 
 
The important question arises, which should govern the public high school of the city of La Porte, as to the 
branches of learning to be taught and the course of instruction therein,—the school trustees of such city, to 
whom the law has confided the direction of these matters, or the mere arbitrary will of the relator [i.e., the 
parent], without cause or reason in its support?  We are of opinion that only one answer can or ought to be 
given to this question.  The arbitrary wishes of the relator in the premises must yield and be subordinated to 
the governing authorities of the school city of La Porte, and their reasonable rules and regulations for the 
government of the pupils of its high school. 
 
Id. at 713-14.  For the supreme court of New Hampshire, it was novel doctrine that “each parent had the power . . . 
to decide the question what studies the scholars should pursue, or what exercises they should perform.”  Kidder v. 
Chellis, 59 N.H. 473, 476 (1879).  This would be a power “of disorganizing the school, and practically rendering it 
substantially useless;” and “however judicious it may be to consult the wishes of parents, the disintegrating principle 
of parental authority to prevent all classification and destroy all system in any school, public or private, is unknown 
to the law.” Id. 
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sometimes optional) part of the public school curriculum.  In these cases, the parent was given a 
paramount right to choose what courses his child would take from those dictated by the state-
mandated curriculum.  Though the presumption was that the parent would make “a wise and 
judicious selection,” the rights of the parent, not the best interests of the child, were the focus of 
judicial attention.217 
 In 1919, Nebraska and sixteen other states passed statutes prohibiting the teaching of 
foreign languages in private as well as public schools.  To the Nebraska Supreme Court, hearing 
a challenge to the state language prohibition law, the salutary purpose of the legislation was 
clear, and well within the sphere of the state’s police power.218  In dissent, Judge Charles B. 
Letton protested that the measure upset the proper allocation of educational control between 
parent and state, and thereby “infringe[d] upon the fundamental rights and liberty of a citizen 
protected by the state and federal Constitutions.”219  Letton conceded that the state could manage 
and control private schools, but the state had no right “to prevent parents from bestowing upon 
their children a full measure of education in addition to the state required branches.” 
Has it the right to prevent the study of music, of drawing, of handiwork, in classes or 
private schools, under the guise of police power?  If not, it has no power to prevent the 
study of French, Spanish, Italian, or any other foreign or classic language, unless such 
study interferes with the education in the language of our country, prescribed by the 
statute.220 
 
 Before the Court in 1923, Mullen held out the awful prospect of a state parenting 
monopoly.  He portrayed the case as one about “the power of a legislative majority to take the 
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child from the parent.”221  In this he had the support of law professor William D. Guthrie, whose 
amicus brief addressed the constitutionality of state laws requiring attendance at public schools, 
specifically the Oregon statute that had been adopted by popular initiative in 1922.222  In her 
pioneering study of the Court’s seminal due process parenting cases, Barbara Bennett 
Woodhouse notes that “[p]aradoxically, Guthrie’s enlistment in the battle against universal 
common schooling had its greatest impact not on the Oregon law but on the Supreme Court’s 
handling of the language laws in Meyer v. Nebraska.”223   
 By 1923, Guthrie was no stranger to litigation pitting parent against state.  He had 
opposed child welfare measures, Woodhouse contends, because they “were the first step toward 
expropriating the children of America and ending the supremacy of their fathers as governors of 
hearth and home.”224  This “supremacy,” for Guthrie, was not an expression of command, as it 
might have been for Spencer; it was the most natural expression of a parent’s hopes for the child. 
Children are, in the end, what men and women live for.  Through them parents realize, as 
it were, immortality.  To the parent the child represents the sum of all his hopes.  One’s 
defeated aspirations, his children may achieve; his unfulfilled ambitions, they may 
realize.  All that we missed, lost, failed of, our children may have, do, accomplish, in 
fullest measure.225 
 
What business had the state meddling in matters like these?  To Guthrie, as Woodhouse says, 
state regulation of the domestic sanctuary “violated the divinely ordained natural order and 
contravened a man’s liberty, property, and religious freedoms—guaranteed by the First, Fifth, 
and Fourteenth Amendments—to direct the life of his family.”226   
 Writing while the Red Scare continued to grip the nation, Guthrie described the  
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Oregon act as “a revolutionary piece of legislation,” evoking images of Bolshevik menace.227   
But communism, as revolutionary as it was, was just the latter-day face of a state paternalism 
that would turn back the cultural clock to a social stage “long ago repudiated.” 
Anything more un-American and more in conflict with the fundamental principles of our 
institutions, it would be difficult to imagine. . . .  The notion of Plato that in a Utopia the 
state would be the sole repository of parental authority and duty and the children be 
surrendered to it for upbringing and education, was long ago repudiated as impossible 
and impracticable in a workaday world where men and women lived, loved, had children 
and sought advancement in the struggle of life.228 
 
 With communism providing a ready target, with Plato’s Republic “a convenient 
shorthand,” as Woodhouse writes, for the socialist state,229 parental advocates, like Mullen and 
Guthrie, turned on its head the anti-patriarchal model of social progress.  They deplored “[t]he 
notion of Plato that in a Utopia the state would be the sole repository of parental authority and 
duty and the children be surrendered to it for upbringing and education.”230  In their view, a state 
educational monopoly would “change the entire course of the human race.”231  Socialism was 
just modern barbarism, and the barbarians were at the gates.232 
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 In The Republic and in The Laws, Plato offered a vision of a unified society, where the 
needs of children are met not by parents but by the government, and where no intermediate forms 
of association stand between the individual and the state.  The vision is a brilliant one, but it is not 
our own. . . . 
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presented on February 12, 1920), in WILLIAM D. GUTHRIE, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND MISCELLANEOUS 
ADDRESSES 211-23, 224-44 (1923). 
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Conclusion 
 For supporters of parental rights, Meyer, Pierce, and their progeny are a measure of how 
far we have traveled from the paternalism of the past.  These cases would become the 
constitutional starting point for those who argue that the right to parent is a legal and moral 
bulwark against state regulation.  
 In the 1920’s, as today, the radical open-endedness of the “liberty” protected by the Due 
Process Clause was, to say the least, problematic.  Then, as now, the Court sought some 
historical marker to guide the due process inquiry: 
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty thus 
guaranteed, the term has received much consideration and some of the included things 
have been definitely stated.  Without doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily 
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common 
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up 
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally 
to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly 
pursuit of happiness by free men.233  
 
Which leaves an obvious question:  Was the right to parent among those privileges long 
recognized at common law?  The answer is not as obvious.   
 In 1879, Louise Hart left her husband Charles, taking with her the couple’s infant son, 
Charles Hart, Jr.  Louise claimed that her separation was justified by her husband’s abusive 
conduct.  Denying the allegations of cruelty, Charles countered that Louise was without legal 
right to possess and restrain the child.  He petitioned the court on a writ of habeas corpus to 
obtain custody of his son.234 
                                                 
233 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (emphasis added). 
234 Commonwealth ex rel. Hart v. Hart, 14 Phil. Rep. 352, 353 (Pa. 1880).  On habeas corpus as the key procedural 
mechanism that allowed courts to develop a discretionary custody standard based on the best interests of the child, 
see SHULMAN supra note 28. 
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 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court began its analysis by pointing out that the conflict’s 
resolution really depended on whose common law is being talked about.  If the controversy were 
to be decided by the ancient common law of England, “there would be little difficulty in granting 
the prayer of the petitioner [i.e., the father].”235  British common law (prior to nineteenth-century 
reforms) “conceded to a father the undoubted right as guardian by nature and for nurture of his 
minor child.”236  The doctrine was a stringent one, “founded on . . . the recognized relation in 
which a husband stood, as the head of the family, to both wife and children, having a right to 
control the person of his wife, so that he could enforce a restoration to conjugal duty, and to the 
persons and services of his children.”237 
 The problem for Mr. Hart was that the British common law doctrine—“it may safely be 
affirmed,” the court said—“was never received as recognized law of Pennsylvania.”238 
Pennsylvania courts  
have given a more liberal, a more humane application the principle of the controlling 
power of the State as parens patriae, looking more to the defense of those who are unable 
to defend themselves, and to the interest which society has in the proper care and training 
of children upon whom it is to depend upon its future existence.239 
 
For the Hart court, the parent-child relation was not a legal entity unto itself.  The relation has a 
public dimension, making the family in part a public franchise: 
As in the contract of marriage, there are three parties whose interests and rights are to be 
considered: those of the husband; the wife; and the State; so in all questions touching the 
custody of children there are three interests involved: those of the parents; of the State; 
and of the infant; and of these three the consideration which is most important and 
controlling is the latter, because upon its proper determination the interests of the other 
two are in a great degree dependent.240 
 
                                                 
235 14 Phil. Rep. at 353. 
236 Id. 
237 Id. at 353-54. 
238 Id. at 354. 
239 Id. at 356. 
240 Id. 
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This network of interests, so the court said, is protected by the equitable principles that play an 
“illustrious part” in the state’s common law.  And it has been this way, the court went on, “from 
the beginning.”  The state of Pennsylvania had never “been bound to a strict adherence as to the 
old common law rules as to the custody of children.”241   
In this regard, Pennsylvania was hardly unique.  Reviewing the case law of the nineteenth 
century, Lewis Hochheimer—his treatise on the law of child custody was a familiar reference for 
courts in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—concluded that “[t]he general result 
of the American cases may be characterized as an utter repudiation of the notion, that there can 
be such a thing as a proprietary right of interest in or to the custody of an infant.”242  It is true, of 
course, that in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as today, claims of right (natural and 
civil) were advanced in support of parental power.243  Still, as Hochheimer observed, the 
prevailing legal current, driven by the equitable force of trust principles, had swept away such 
“narrow contentions.”  
The entire tendency of the American courts is, to put aside with an unsparing hand all 
technical objections and narrow contentions whereby it may be attempted to erect claims 
of supposed legal right, on a foundation of wrong to persons who are a peculiar object of 
the solicitude and protecting care of the law.244 
                                                 
241 Id. (internal citation and quotation omitted); cf. R. Collin Mangrum, Exclusive Reliance on Best Interest May be 
Unconstitutional: Religion as a Factor in Child Custody Cases, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 25 (1981) (“The feudal 
structure out of which the property-oriented rule of paternal preference arose was never part of our tradition.  The 
English common law was ‘received’ by the newly-formed states after the Revolution only insofar as it fit the 
circumstances of the respective states.”).  On local custom and the adaptability of American common law, see 
ELLEN HOLMES PEARSON, REMAKING CUSTOM: LAW AND IDENTITY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 11-30 
(2011). 
242 LEWIS HOCHHEIMER, THE LAW RELATING TO THE CUSTODY OF INFANTS, 22 (§ 22) (3d ed. Baltimore: Harold 
Scrimger, 1899) 22 (§ 22). 
243 Uniformity is hardly to be expected from “[t]he American federal system in which each state had jurisdiction 
over domestic relations,” a system which “produced a range of custody and other family laws.” Michael Grossberg, 
Comment, Who Determines Children’s Best Interests?, 17 L. & HIST. REV. 309, 313-14 (1999). 
244 HOCHHEIMER, THE CUSTODY OF INFANTS, supra note 242, at 22–23 (§ 22); cf., e.g., ROLLIN C. HURD, A 
TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS, 461 (2d ed. Albany, W. C. 
Little, 1876) (“In controversies between parents for the custody of their legitimate children, the right of the father is 
held to be paramount to that of the mother; but the welfare of the child and not the technical legal right is the 
criterion by which to determine to whom the custody of the child shall be awarded.”); JAMES SCHOULER, A 
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 365 (§ 339) (2d ed. Boston, Little, Brown, 1874) (“The 
cardinal principle relative to such matters is to regard the benefit of the infant; to make the welfare of the children 
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Far from being absolute, the rights of the parent were not even the custody courts’ 
primary consideration.  “The true view,” as one mid-nineteenth century court put it, “is that the 
rights of the child are alone to be considered, and those rights clearly are to be protected.”245  The 
very idea that parents have rights as parents was called into question.  The New York Court for 
the Correction of Errors was not alone when it declared that “there is no parental authority 
independent of the supreme power of the state.  But the former is derived altogether from the 
latter.”246   
 When the Supreme Court in Meyer and Pierce enrolled the right to parent among those 
privileges long recognized at common law, it fabricated the right it purported to find.   It was an 
ambitious task, one that involved a rewriting of legal history.  And more.  In the shadow of the 
Russian Revolution, the Court set itself in opposition to the antipatriarchal story of progress that 
had such currency throughout the nineteenth century.  With Sparta as its communistic demon, the 
Court took two cases about state educational regulations and made them the vehicle for a 
statement about the history of the entire human race. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
paramount to the claims of either parent. . . . [J]udicial precedents, judicial dicta, and legislative enactments all lead 
to one and the same irresistible conclusion. The primary object of the American decisions is then to secure the 
welfare of the child, and not the special claims of one or the other parent.”) (footnote omitted); English v. English, 
32 N.J. Eq. 738, 742–43 (N.J. Err. & App. 1880) (“In considering the grounds which should have weight in deciding 
controversies of this character, while the rights of parents will not be disregarded or their interests overlooked, the 
court will not be controlled in its decision by the strict rights of either party, but will determine the question of 
custody mainly upon considerations of advantage to the infant; the cardinal rule of action governing the court being 
regard to the benefits of the minor, holding its welfare superior to the claims of either parent.”); cf. also 
“Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family,” 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1223 (1980) (“[Nineteenth-
century custody courts] often held that the presumption of parental custody was based upon the extent to which the 
parent successfully served the state’s interest in promoting the child’s welfare, rather than upon any inherent right of 
the parent. Most late nineteenth century courts thus acknowledged that the child’s welfare, not the parent’s legal 
right, was the determinative factor in private custody decisions under the parens patriae power.”) (footnotes 
omitted). 
245 In re 5 New York Legal Observer 265, 267 (N.Y. Super. 1847). 
246 Mercein v. People ex rel. Barry, 25 Wend. 64, 103 (N.Y. 1840). 
